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Abstract
The integration process in the European banking sector considerably differs with regard to
product types. Deep integration can be observed in the money market as well as the market
for wholesale products. In contrast to that, a strong segmentation of national markets still ex-
ists in the field of retail products. In this context, the paper analyses market access strategies
of European banks. The analysis is based both on aggregate sectoral data and on four com-
pany case studies (BSCH, Nordea Group, BNP Paribas and HSBC). It is explored to which
extent different market access strategies contribute to the integration of the European retail
markets. A clear result is that mergers and acquisition as well as cooperations and strategic
alliances form the most important market access strategies. Direct cross-border sales and the
establishment of branches and subsidiaries are of minor importance. All strategies are compli-
cated by considerable natural and politically induced barriers to market access. In particular,
such politically induced barriers are different national supervision of banks, different tax leg-
islation, as well as national accounting and take-over principles. Here, further harmonizations
are suited to accelerate the integration of European retail markets and thus to increase con-
sumer benefits by lower prices and a higher product variety for financial services.
JEL-Classification: G 21, G 28, G 34
Keywords: European integration, cross-border banking, mergers and acquisitions, regulations
*This paper is part of a study that was initiated and sponsored by the European Financial
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11. Introduction
Over the last years, competition in the European banking sector has intensified considerably.
The following factors have been decisive for the evolution of the European financial sector:
the liberalization of the European financial sector, technological progress as well as an ampli-
fied diversification of savings and assets. The introduction of the Euro goes along with an
accelerated integration of the market for financial services and leads to a further increase in
competition and structural changes in the banking sector (DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, 1999;
GALATI and TSATSARONIS, 2001). However, timeframe and depth of this structural change
vary noticeably between the different sections of European banking. While the money market
and the market for wholesale products (wholesale banking) already form a common European
market, there still is an extensive segmentation of national markets for retail products (retail
banking). Responsible for this low degree of integration in retail markets are a number of
natural barriers, such as language or culture, as well as politically induced market access
barriers such as regulations or taxation, which make cross-border trade in financial services
more difficult (ECB, 1999a). Further deregulation and harmonization towards an integrated
European retail market are suitable to increase customer benefits by fostering product diversi-
fication and lower prices.
Within the framework of this study, firstly, different market access strategies of the banking
sector are systematized. Then it is analyzed, to which extent different strategies contribute to
the integration of European retail markets. By examining the banks Banco Santander Central
Hispano (Spain), Nordea Group (Sweden), BNP Paribas (France), as well as HSBC (Eng-
land), market access strategies of four European top banks are illustrated in case studies. Sec-
ondly, motives, problems as well as consequences accompanied with these strategies are dis-
cussed. Thirdly, it is examined in detail which politically induced market access barriers cur-
rently complicate cross-border trade in financial services and which steps towards a further
harmonization and integration are taken on EU level. Finally, consumer benefits of a future
integration of European retail markets are discussed briefly.
2. Importance of different market access strategies
Basically, the variety of market access strategies in the banking sector can be summarized
under four main headings. Direct cross-border sales mean trade of financial services without
any physical presence of banks in target markets. This category comprises telephone banking,
conventional mail marketing and, in particular, internet banking. The second strategy is the
2establishment of branches or subsidiaries in the target country. Mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) constitute the third strategy (ECB, 1999a). These are usually followed by consider-
able modifications in the organizational and legal structure of the respective companies. Fi-
nally, market access can be achieved by cooperations and strategic alliances. Here, it is deci-
sive that there is only a minority stake.
Direct cross-border sales
Different market access strategies in the banking sector differ in the extent of their contribu-
tion to the integration of European retail markets. A low contribution is achieved by direct
cross-border sales of financial services. Merely 2.8% of all credits to private non-banks oc-
curred in 1999 were in the „cross-border“ category. Their growth rate of 23.5%, however,
appeared higher than the growth rate of domestic credits, which was 9.2% (ECB, 2000a).
Branches and subsidiaries
The market share of foreign branches and subsidiaries (Table 1) - measured in relation to
total bank assets - in 1997 was less than 10%. Merely 3.4% in European mean applied to
branches. Higher market shares occurred only in Belgium (28.2%), Ireland (45.4%) as well as
in Luxembourg (90.9%). The small market share of foreign branches and subsidiaries con-
firms the assumption that banking operations in Europe concentrate on domestic markets to a
considerable extent (ECB, 1999a and ECB, 1999b). Up to now, the „Freedom of establish-
ment“ for branches in Europe also had no essential impulse on further integration.
Table 1: Market share of foreign branches and subsidiaries from Europe in 1997
(as a percentage of total domestic assets)
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Market share of foreign
branches 0.7 9.0 7.1 0.9 11.1 17.7 3.6 19.4 2.3 2.5 1.3 4.8 22.5 3.4
Market share of foreign
subsidiaries 1.6 19.2 -- 1.4 1.8 27.8 1.7 71.1 3.0 6.8 -- 3.4 1.0 n.a.
Market share of total foreign
branches and subsidiaries 2.3 28.2 7.1
n.
a.
2.4 13.0 45.4 5.3 90.9 5.3 9.4 1.3 8.2 23.4 n.a.
Source: ECB (1999a) and ECB(1999b)
3Mergers and acquisitions
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, a substantial consolidation process within the banking
sector can be observed. In particular, mergers and acquisitions led to a decreased number of
banking institutions all over Europe. The amount of mergers and acquisitions in the European
banking sector in 1997 was about 280, compared to 440 in 1999. In the same period, the aver
age value of mergers and acquisitions tripled from 200 to 600 million Euro (ECB, 2000a and
ECB, 2000b).
Up to now, however, the consolidation process concerned to a large extent the respective do-
mestic market. In 1999, merely 19.5% of mergers and acquisitions within the European
banking sector occurred cross-border, which means an increase in comparison to the 1997
figure of 16% (OECD, 2001). Also taking into consideration cross-border mergers and acqui-
sitions with non-European countries, the share is noticeably higher. This higher share is in
particular attributed to the entry of European banks in Emerging Markets (ECB, 2000b). The
trend of entering foreign markets by mergers and acquisitions to increase one’s own market
share still seems to intensify. The trend is accompanied by an increasing number of coopera-
tions and strategic alliances. In comparison to other entry strategies, mergers and acquisitions
seem to contribute most significantly to the integration of European retail markets in the fu-
ture. The appendix shows the most important mergers and acquisitions within the European
banking sector since the introduction of the Euro.
In addition to mergers and acquisitions within the banking sector, a number of cross-industry
mergers and acquisitions involving banks can also be observed (conglomerates). In particular,
large banks diversify their business fields with the objective of reaching broad market cover-
age in financial services (one-stop finance) (WILLMAN, 2000a). Not only capital investment
companies (e.g. fund companies), but also insurance companies are the target objects of
mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector. Up to now, however, mergers and acquisitions
mainly were carried out within the banking sector. The share of domestic and cross-border
conglomerates amounts to only 23% of all mergers and acquisitions with banking companies
in the 1990’s (OECD, 2001). An overview of the main types of M&A is given in table 2.
Prospect of future relative importance of strategies
There are different assessments of the future importance of the different market access strate-
gies with respect to the integration of the European retail market. However, there seems to be
4consensus with regard to the fundamental tendencies. For instance, direct cross-border sales
of financial services - for example by internet – seems to be limited in spite of technological
Table 2: Main types of European M&As in the banking industry
Within banking industry Cross industry
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Domestic bank M&As
M&As involving credit institutions located in the same country.
Examples:
• Banco Santander/Banco Central
Hispanoamericano (1999)
• BNP/Paribas (1999)
The most dominant type of M&As in the European banking
industry: 60.7% of all European banking M&A transactions
between 1990 and 1999 took place within the domestic banking
industry (1990: 44%, 1995: 45.8%, 1999: 61.4%)
Domestic conglomeration
M&As involving credit institutions and insurances and/or other
financial institutions all located in the same country.
Examples:
• Credit Suisse/Winterthur (1997)
• Citicorp/Travelers Group (1998)
Less dominant than domestic M&As within the banking indus-
try: 16.1% of all banking M&A transactions between 1990 and
1999 were domestic cross industry transactions; after an in-
crease in the mid-nineties (1990: 16%, 1995: 22.9%, 1999: 12.5)
there are declining shares in the last years.
C
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International bank M&As
M&As involving credit institutions located in different coun-
tries, one of which is an EU country.
Examples:
• Deutsche Bank/Bankers Trust (1998)
• HypoVereinsbank/Bank Austria (2000)
• Nordea Group (2000)
Less dominant than domestic bank M&As but the most in-
creasing type of M&As involving the banking industry: 16.1%
of all banking M&A transactions between 1990 and 1999 were
cross-border bank M&As (1990: 30%, 1991: 10%, 1993: 10.8%,
1995:20.1%, 1999: 19.5)
International conglomeration
M&As involving credit institutions located in an EU country
and insurances and/or other financial institutions located in
another EU or third country.
Examples:
• Deutsche Bank/Morgan Grenfell (1997)
• Dresdner Bank/Kleinwort Benson (1995)
Less dominant type of European M&A transactions in recent
years and at present: 7.1% of all transactions involving the
European banking industry between 1990 and 1999 were inter-
national cross industry transactions; after increasing shares in
the mid-nineties (1990: 8%, 1995: 11.2%) there is a decline
during the last years (1997: 9.6%, 1998: 8.5%, 1999: 6.5%).
Sources: Following ECB (2000b) and OECD (2001)
progress. In particular, different product definitions or missing proximity to customers are
responsible here (HABERER, 1993 and SCHÜLER, 2002). The expansion of a new branch net-
work abroad remains unattractive for financial reasons (fixed costs), because of existing over-
capacities as well as due to new sale technologies (CROWDER, 1999; THE ECONOMIST, 1998;
ACKERMANN, 1998 and HABERER, 1993). Furthermore, such “greenfield” investments are
accompanied by high time exposures - not only concerning the setup of new brand names.
Yields occur with a considerable time lag, which counteracts the interests of shareholders.
Presumably, mergers and acquisitions will represent the most important market access strat-
egy in the future, too. However, due to disproportionate risks, a noticeable increase of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions will not occur until consolidation on the domestic market has
5been completed (NAIRN, 2000). In this context, cooperations and alliances are taken as a
strategy which is accompanied by lower risks. In particular, cooperations and alliances pro-
vide access to the distribution channels of foreign partners. While the trend to diversification
in the field of large banks (one-stop finance) will be continuing, small and medium banks will
increasingly specialize regionally and by the products offered and will unwind most parts of
small customer business. For this reason, long-term integration of European retail markets
seems to be limited – against the background of an extensive integration of money markets
and wholesale markets (ECB, 1999a). Last but not least, the share of retail business by banks
is regressive due to increasing disintermediation. An increasing importance of retail banking
is only expected in the markets of Eastern Europe.
3. Case Studies
After the analysis of their macroeconomic importance we now examine different market ac-
cess strategies of European banks within the framework of case studies of individual enter-
prises. For this purpose, market access strategies of Banco Santander Central Hispano
(BSCH), with their head offices in Spain, Nordea Group, headquartered in Sweden, BNP
Paribas (France), as well as the HSBC, with head offices in England, are analyzed.
Banco Santander Central Hispano
Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH) is among the ten largest European banks, with a
market capitalization of EUR 47 billion (2001) and 126,000 employees worldwide (Table 3).
The market access strategies pursued by BSCH comprise direct cross-border sales, the foun-
dation of branches, as well as mergers and acquisitions. For the purpose of direct sales of fi-
nancial services, the group set up the European Internet Bank Patagon as well as the phone
bank Santander Direkt. The worldwide branch network currently contains 10,800 branches in
42 countries. Mergers and acquisitions can be classified as the most important market access
strategy of the BSCH within Europe. A cross-border expansion took place here particularly in
the Portuguese, the German as well as in the Italian market. Mergers and acquisitions were
complemented through the exchange of know-how with various European partners in the
form of cooperations and strategic alliances. Offering a wide range of products through vari-
ous channels of distribution can be considered as a goal of BSCH‘s market access strategy.
The internet will take an important position in the future sales of financial services (BSCH,
2001).
6Table 3: Market Access Strategy of Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH)
General Company Data
! One of the European top-10-banks (€ 47 bn market capitalization per 31 March 2001);
! More than 10,800 branches in 42 countries;
! More than 126,000 employees world wide;
Pan-European strategy
! Joint ventures and exchange of expertise with large European partners, e.g. by cooperations and
strategic cross-border alliances with Société Générale (F), Royal Bank of Scotland (GB), San
Paolo-IMI (I) and Commerzbank (Ger);
! Creation of the pan-European Internet bank Patagon.com;
! Expansion of Patagon in Latin America (planned);
Recent cross-border
expansion activities
! Target Countries Portugal Germany Italy Spain
! Date of first entry 1993 1995 1998 1999
! Entry method ! 1993: Acquisition
of Banco de
Comércio e Ind-
ústria and change
of brand to Banco
Santander Portu-
gal in 1998;
! 1999: Acquisition
of Banco Totta &
Açores and
Crédito Predial
Portugues;
! Acquisition of
CC-Bank by
Banco Santander;
! Setting up of the
subsidiary San-
tander Direkt
Bank (telephone
bank) by Banco
Santander;
! Integration of the
operations of
Open Bank (ac-
quired by Pa-
tagon.com) and
Santander Direkt
Bank under the
Patagon.com
brand (planned);
! Co-ownership of
Finconsumo (ac-
quisition of 50%
by BSCH);
! Acquisition of
Banesto;
! Domestic Merger
of Banco San-
tander and Banco
Central Hispano-
america with brand
BSCH (but no full
consolidation of
operations);
! Products offered Full banking service Full banking service Loans and credit Full banking service
! Distribution channel Multi-channel Mainly direct via
telephone- or online-
banking
Multi-channel Multi-channel
Source: Following DATAMONITOR (2000) and BSCH (2001)
Nordea Group
The merger of Merita (Fin) and Nordbanken (Swe) in 1998 was the first cross-border merger
of two European top banks of the same size (Table 4). The consortium expanded in 2000 by
the merger of MeritaNordbanken and Unidanmark (DK). After an acquisition of Christiania
Bank og Kreditkasse (Nor) was rejected first by the Norwegian government, in 2000 Merita-
Nordbanken, Unidanmark and Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse finally formed Nordea Group,
which represents the largest bank consortium in Northern Europe, with a market capitalization
of approx. EUR 20 billion (2001), 1,481 branches and 37,630 employees. The main motives
to form Nordea were different kinds of synergies (e.g. economies of scale ond scope) as well
as an increased market share in the nordic market, including also Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Poland. Nordea Group pursues a multi-channel distribution strategy that contains one of
the most successful phone (e.g. WAP banking in cooperation with Nokia) and internet serv-
ices of the world, offering almost complete services of the Nordea Group. The cross industry
7merger of Unidanmark and the insurer Tryg-Baltica (DK) forced the selling of insurance pro-
dukts (household and general insurance) too (one-stop finance). Using a multi-channel distri-
bution strategy, e.g. the common internet bank (Solo Internet Bank), existing barriers to mar-
ket access ought to be bypassed. In the context of politically induced barriers to market ac-
cess, especially different national supervision institutions, different consumer protection rules
(e.g. different deposit guaranty systems or cross-border management of bank secrets) and dif-
ferent national tax legislations (e.g. Danmark) are mentioned by Nordea Group. Last but not
least, Nordea Group could strongly contribute to the integration of financial services market
in Northern Europe due to the smaller cultural and social differences between the northern in
comparison to the southern countries in Europe. However, after the consolidation process is
completed and all synergies are realized, further expansion, following real trading patterns
with direction south (e.g. Germany, Netherlands) is the natural way to go (NORDEA, 2001).
Table 4: Market Access Strategy of Nordea Group
General Company Data
! MeritaNordbanken, Unidanmark and Christania Bank form the nordic financial group Nordea
(almost € 20 bn market capitalisation per August 2001);
! Nordea Group has a strong distribution network throughout the Nordic and Baltic Sea region
which comprises 1,481 branch offices or Internet-service centres with 37,630 employees;
! Nordea is present in 22 countries including 14 countries outside the Nordic and Baltic Sea region;
Pan-European strategy
! “One-bank-shopping-concept”: to provide a single point of entry for customers to enable them to
get access to the entire supply of services of all integrated banks; single brand Nordea for all
banks from December 2001;
! Branches network in the Nordic region, representative offices and cooperation with local banks in
the most important European cities and countries;
! Integrated Internet-banking: Solo as a full-service Internet bank;
Recent
expansion activities
! Target Countries Finland and Sweden Denmark Norway Sweden
! Date of first entry 1998 2000 2000 2001
! Entry method ! Merger between
Merita (Fin) and
Nordbanken (S) into
MeritaNordbanken
with Nordic Baltic
Holding as the
bank’s holding
company;
! Acquisition of
Unidanmark by
MeritaNordbanken;
! Acquisition of
Christiania
Bank  og
Kredtkasse to
form Nordea
Group;
! Acquisition of
Postgirot (Swe)
by Nordea;
! Products offered ! Allfinance (incl. lifeinsurance products in all nordic countries and non lifeinsurance products in
Norway, Denmark and Finland)
! Cross-selling potential due to the integration into Nordea
! Distribution channel Multi-channel
(branches, telephone, internet)
Source: Following DATAMONITOR (2000) and NORDEA (2001)
2000: Integration of Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (K-Bank) (Nor), Merita Bank (Fin),
Nordbanken (Swe) and Unidanmark (DK) into Nordea Group;
8BNP Paribas
BNP Paribas (F) is among the ten largest European banks, with a market capitalization of
EUR 41.9 billion (2001) and 80,000 employees worldwide (Table 5). BNP Paribas was
formed by a domestic merger of BNP (F) and Paribas (F) in 2000. In the 1980s, Paribas en-
tered the Spanish market by establishing a new branch net. These branches were sold in 2000
due to high fixed costs against the backround of a relativly low market share. For the same
reason Paribas sold its branches in Belgium and the Netherlands in 1997. Currently, BNP
Paribas only in France operates through a branch net of its own. Cross-border distribution
predominantly is conducted through branches of European partners. For instance, market ac-
cess to Germany was obtained by a joint venture of BNP Paribas and Dresdner Bank in 2000.
Table 5: Market Access Strategy of BNP Paribas
General Company Data
! One of the European top-ten-banks (market capitalisation at 31 Dec 2000: € 41.9 bn;
! Operations in 87 countries in Europe, Asia and United States;
! 80,000 employees, including 61,000 in Europe, including 49,000 in France;
! Network of 2,200 branches in France, 13.1 million retail customers in the EU;
Pan-European strategy ! Set-up of Multichannel Bank;! Cross-selling between the various business units and with other divisions of the Group;
Recent
expansion activities
! Target Countries France Germany Spain Pan-European
! Date of first entry 2000 2000 1980`s 1990`s
! Entry method ! Merger between
BNP and Paribas
to create BNP
Paribas;
! 1998 merger
between Com-
pagnie Financière
de Paribas,
Banque Paribas
and Compagnie
Bancaire to form
Paribas;
! 1993 Privatisation
of BNP
! Joint venture
between BNP
Paribas and
Dresdner Bank
! Establishing of a
branch net (sold
in 2000)
Different market access
strategies (e.g. “Cardif-
model”, “Cetelem-
model”)
! Products offered Full banking service Consumer finance Private Banking (only
wealthy customers)
Full banking service
! Distribution channel Multi-channel Multi-channel Traditional Multi-channel
Source: BNP PARIBAS (2001)
Furthermore BNP Paribas distributes retail products via the subsidiaries Cardif (bank insurer)
and Cetelem (consumer bank). Cardif predominantly sells through branches (direct marketing
or telemarketing) of pan-European partners (banks, finance companies, commercial firms and
insurers). In France Cardif cooperates with Crédit du Nord, Banque Directe, Banque Hervet
as well as Cartol. Cetelem distributes a complete range of financial products through branches
of foreign partners (cooperations and alliances with retail banks and financial institutions)
9such as Savings Bank of Florence (Ita), Caixa Galicia (Spa) Dresdner Bank (Ger) and others.
Via partnerships with Ikea, Carrefour or Conforama Cetelem also conducts point-of-sale fi-
nance. A further pan-European strategy comprises the constitution of product specialists (e.g.
for online brokerage or mortgages), who cooperate with partners abroad. These different
kinds of cooperations and alliances are suited to bypass barriers to market access. Here in
particular different national tax legislation or accounting standards, as well as different con-
sumer protection regulations are noted by BNP Paribas (BNP PARIBAS, 2001).
HSBC
With 23 million customers and approx. 6,500 offices in 78 countries, HSBC is one of the larg-
est providers of financial services in the world (Table 6).
Table 6: Market Access Strategy of HSBC
General Company Data ! One of the European top-10-banks (more than € 125 bn market capitalisation per August 2001);! 6,500 offices in 78 countries;
Pan-European strategy
! Global online banking and investment services: creation of the Merrill Lynch-HSBC online bank;
! Focus on private banking business;
! Focus on expansion by organic growth complemented with strategic acquisitions;
Recent
expansion activities
! Target Countries Luxembourg Spain United Kingdom France Greece
! Date of first entry 1977 1982 1992 1881 2001
! Entry method ! In-
dependent
start-up
(HSBC
Luxem-
bourg);
! In-
dependent
start-up
(HSBC
Spain);
! Midland Bank
becomes wholy
owned member
of the HSBC
Group; Midland
bank was re-
named HSBC
bank in 1999;
! 2000: partner-
ship with
Merrill Lynch
to create a
global online
banking and in-
vestment serv-
ices company
(Merrill Lynch-
HSCB);
! 2000: Acquisi-
tion of Crédit
Commercial de
France (CCF) ;
! Acquisition
of the Bar-
clays
branches;
! Products offered
Private banking with focus on
wealthy customers Full banking service
Private banking with
a more comprehen-
sive product range
than in other coun-
tries
Private banking
! Distribution channel
Traditional Multi-channel Traditional
Source: Following DATAMONITOR (2000) and HSBC (2001)
HSBC started as a colonial bank in Hong Kong from where the company expanded to Asia
and the rest of the world. On the European market, HSBC was represented noticeably only in
England for a long time. Market shares in Luxembourg, Spain and France were low. With the
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take-over of CCF in 2000, the enterprise gave up its strategy of organic growth and acquired
large market shares in France. While in England HSBC concentrates on mass market, the
take-over of CCF targets personal asset management of customers in the middle and upper
wealth bracket. The joint venture of HSBC and Merrill Lynch marks the first connection of
this kind worldwide. The offer of Merrill Lynch-HSBC contains broker as well as retail serv-
ices, whereby all services are offered exclusively over the internet (HSBC, 2001).
4. What can we learn from these case studies?
From the viewpoint of individual enterprises, the cases of Banco Santander Central Hispano,
Nordea Group, BNP Paribas as well as HSCB clarify which important role mergers and ac-
quisitions play within the integration of European retail markets. The case studies confirm the
macroeconomic observation on the different importance of different strategies to market ac-
cess. All of the examined banks pursue multi-channel distribution strategies. However, im-
portant cross-border market shares are predominantly acquired by mergers and acquisitions
(e.g. acquisition of CCF by HSBC, merger of Merita and Nordbanken) as well as cooperations
and alliances (e.g. BNP Paribas). In addition, particulary the foundation of telephone- and
internet banks (e.g. Patagon, Santander Direkt Bank, Solo Internet Bank or Merrill Lynch-
HSBC) are of increasing importance. A considerable technical progress with regard to com-
munication technologies accelerates this development. The foundation of branches or subsidi-
aries is – for the reasons mentioned above (fixed costs, problems in establishing new brand
names, yields with significant time lags) – of no considerable future importance. The example
of BNP Paribas clarifies, that there is even a trend to decrease the number of branches.
As mergers and acquisitions is the most important strategy the motives and risks accompanied
by different forms of mergers and acquisitions are summarized in table 7. Economies of scale
and economies of scope are regarded as the most important motives for the execution of
mergers and acquisitions. In addition to these cost-sided arguments, higher market shares as
well as product- and risk diversity are particularly important (NAIRN, 2000).
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Table 7: Motives and risks with four types of Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As)
Within banking industry Cross industry
W
ith
in
 b
or
de
r
Domestic bank M&As
Main motives:
• Cost benefits from economies of scale, e.g.
by reduction of surplus staff and overlapping branches or
mutual use of administrative functions;
• Increasing market share;
Main risks:
• Pricing of the strategic risks;
• Operational risks after the transaction, mainly related to
the integration of personnel, information and risk man-
agement, customer and account systems etc.
Domestic conglomeration
Main motives:
• Cost benefits from economies of scope through cross-selling;
• Revenue enhancement due to product diversification;
• Risk diversification;
Main risks:
• Increased ex ante risks because of  different business area;
• Reputation risks (failure of one company may lead to declin-
ing reputation of the whole conglomerate);
• Increased integration difficulties due to different fiscal and
accounting treatment etc.
C
ro
ss
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International bank M&As
Main motives
• Achieving access and presence in an international market
with a larger customer base (market share);
• Possibility of reaching the critical mass to offer specific
services;
Main risks:
• Increased ex ante risks because of cultural barriers or
differences (unknown market, regulations and practices);
• Different fiscal and accounting treatment and reporting
requirements;
International conglomeration
Main motives:
• Cost benefits from economies of scope through cross-selling;
• Access and presence in international financial markets;
• International product diversification;
Main risks:
• Increased ex ante risks due to a different business area;
• Different fiscal and accounting treatment and reporting re-
quirements;
• Reputation risks;
Source: Following ECB (2000b)
Risks result in particular from the integration of different enterprise cultures and business
fields. Furthermore general factors affecting all companies include risks and represent barriers
to market entry. For instance, "natural barriers" like different cultures or different consumer
preferences are of high relevance, as are "politically induced barriers" like different national
tax-legislation or different regulations (BUCH, 2001). Due to low natural barriers Nordea
Group became the largest bank consortium in Northern Europe, and likewise Banco San-
tander Central Hispano strongly expanded only in Southern Europe (NAIRN, 2000). Because
of different politically induced barriers to market access, all of the examined banks follow a
multi-channel strategy in cross-border trade (e.g. BNP Paribas). However, politically induced
barriers of market access are often responsible for the failure of market access (ECB, 2000a).
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Table 8: Withdrawn M&As in the banking industry
Year Involved banks Reasons for failure
1999 Bank of Ireland (Irl) Alliance and Leicester
(UK)
Disagreements of the involved parties;
1999 BNP (Fra) Société Générale (Fra) Rejection by french banking regulators
2000 Dresdner Bank (Ger) Deutsche Bank (Ger) The Dresdner Bank broke off the merger talks due to
Deutsche Bank’s insistence that Dresdner sell off its
investment bank Kleinwort Benson in whole or in
pieces;
2001 Unicredito (Ita) Commerzbank (Ger) Disagreement on valuation and price of the transaction;
2001 SEB (Swe) Föreningssparbanken
(Swedbank) (Swe)
Rejection by the European Commission due to objec-
tions with regard to antitrust law;
2001 UnoFirst
(created out of merger of Enba's (parent company of
Irish Internet-only bank First-e) (IRL) and BBVA’s
(UK) internet subsidiaries)
Collapse due to some disagreements with respect to
ownership of the technology, regulatory uncertainty, the
sharp fall in high-tech stocks and a reassessment of the
short-term potential of Internet banks (according to
Business&Finance online);
Source: FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND (2001a), FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND (2001b),
BUSINESS&FINANCE (2001) and BBC NEWS (2001)
Table 8 shows cases of withdrawn mergers and acquisitions. As can be seen in addition to
disagreements of the involved parties, rejection by governments or regulatory institutions as
well as regulatory uncertainties often prevent successful market access.
Beyond the case studies, empirical evidence with regard to different barriers to market access,
stems from a QUESTIONING OF LEADING PAN-EUROPEAN BANKING GROUPS conducted in 2001
(Table 9). Natural obstacles like language or consumer preferences noticeably hinder market
access. In contrast market infrastructure or market attractivness seem to be of minor rele-
vance. Within the politically induced barriers especially different tax legislation seem to be of
particular importance. Both, tax legislation and regulations specific to each country represent
- with different levels of importance – the most important obstacles for all of the above-
mentioned market access strategies of banks and thus to the integration of European retail
markets. Furthermore, politically induced barriers - unlike natural barriers - can be removed
by political decisions to increase the potential of future integration and consumer benefits.
Therefore, politically induced barriers are now discussed in more detail.
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Table 9: Relevance of different barriers to market access in regard to
retail bank products
The importance of different barriers is measured by using a scale from 10 (highly relevant) to 1 (no relevance at
all). Source: QUESTIONING OF LEADING PAN-EUROPEAN BANKING GROUPS (2001).
5. Politically induced barriers of cross-border bank activities
Legal regulation with the purpose of creating a common European market for financial serv-
ices of the banking sector are based on a line of decisions and directives (e.g. Single Market
Program, 1992) of the last thirty years (Table 10). In addition to the „Freedom of establish-
ment“, arrangements relating to bank supervision are of considerable importance with regard
to market access decisions of banks. Bank supervision is based on two elements: firstly, on
national responsibility (principles of supervision by the home country and the mutual recog-
nition of admission), and secondly, on the cross-border cooperation of national supervisory
institutions. Furthermore, a minimum harmonization of regulations should be guaranteed
(ECB, 2000a).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
market infrastructure
markets not attraktive
regulation (e.g. supervision,
takeover laws etc.)
taxes
language
consumer loyalty
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Table 10: EU Financial Services Directives (Single Market Program)
1970... 1980... 1990... 2000...
Freedom of establish-
ment
First Banking Directive
Basel Capital Accord
Second Banking Direc-
tive
Cross-border credit
transfers
Third stage of EMU
(mutual currency)
New Basel Accord
Source: EU (2001a) and EU (2001b)
Period of implementation
Community law
Since 1999, the European Union is improving the general conditions for further integration of
the market for financial services within the framework of the "Financial Services Action Plan
(FSAP)". In addition to the retail and wholesale market, measures also concern the position of
the European financial market in relation to non-European financial markets. An overview is
given in table 11.
From the perspective of European banks, however, there is still a line of obstacles which hin-
ders cross-border trade in financial services (QUESTIONING OF LEADING PAN-EUROPEAN
BANKING GROUPS, 2001 (Table 9) and SCHRÖDER, 2001). For instance, the principle of mutual
recognition often is not applied in practice. Although the supervision by the home country is
valid for foreign branches, solvency control, for instance, is under the supervision of the host
country. This makes expansion of a branch network abroad complicated. The strategies of
Banco Santander Central Hispano, Nordea Group, HSBC and especially of BNP Paribas
confirm the problems of creating a branch net abroad.
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Table 11: Objectives of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
Strategic objective Actions in order to achieve the strategic objective are needed to ...
A single EU wholesale market
! enable corporate issuers to raise capital on competitive terms on an EU-wide
basis;
! provide investors and intermediaries with access to all markets from a single
point-of-entry;
! allow investment service providers to offer their services cross-border without
encountering unnecessary obstacles or administrative or legal barriers;
! to establish a sound and well integrated prudential framework within which
asset managers can put funds at their disposal to their most productive use;
! create a legal certainty so that securities trades and settlement are safe from
unnecessary counterparty risk;
Open and secure retail mar-
kets
! equip consumers with the necessary information and clear rights to permit their
full and active participation in the single financial market;
! identify and counteract unjustified insistence on non-harmonised consumer-
business rules as an obstacle to cross-border provision of services;
! create legal conditions in which new distribution channels and distance tech-
nologies can be put to work on a pan-European scale;
! encourage the emergence of cost-effective and secure payment systems which
enable citizens to effect small-value cross-border payments without incurring
exorbitant charges;
State-of-art prudential rules
and supervision
! eliminate any gaps in EU prudential framework, arising from new forms of
financial business or globalisation;
! set rigorous and appropriate standards so that the EU banking sector can suc-
cessfully manage intensification of competitive pressures;
! enable the EU to assume a key role in setting high global standards for regula-
tion and supervision, including financial conglomerates;
Wider conditions for an opti-
mal single financial market
! eliminate disparities in tax treatment
! create an efficient and transparent legal system for corporate governance
Source: Following EUROPÄISCHE KOMMISSION (1999) and EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2001)
Furthermore – as stated e.g. by BNP Paribas - consumer protection regulations differ within
European countries. For cross-border sales of financial services, this calls for compliance to
additional requirements in the respective countries. Additional information costs arise and
thus hinder cross-border sales - for example via internet – especially of small and medium-
sized enterprises. Such obstacles are often used to protect domestic markets. In contrast, large
enterprises - like the cases of Nordea Group (Solo Internet Bank) as well as HSBC (Merrill
Lynch-HSBC) show - use the internet to bypass certain barriers to market access. Different
national supervision practice (different competences of the respective national institution as
well as different reporting requirements for companies) set up such barriers - in particular
with regard to cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Neutrality of competition is not guar-
anteed. In the long run, harmonization in the form of a single European supervisory institution
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for all kinds of financial services possibly could become advisable (ECB, 2000a and
SCHRÖDER, 2001).
Table 12: Take Over–Directive (turned down by European Parliament on 04.07.01)
Motivation and objectives
! a minimum level of protection for minority share-
holders of companies subject to take-over bids
which is equivalent throughout the EU;
! a basic level of disclosure and information to guar-
antee greater transparency during the take-over bid
Proponents and their arguments
! British, Danish, French and Swedish MEPs
(Members of European Parliament) generally sup-
ported the directive;
! they argued that this directive would have made
the European corporate sector more dynamic and
fairer by requiring shareholders’ support before
companies took steps to fight off take-over bids,
thus facilitating hostile take-overs;
Critics and their arguments
! German MEPs in particular, but also Italian and
Spanish MEPs were against the directive;
! they argued that there was no effective possibility
for management of the target company to place de-
fensive measures to frustrate a bid without con-
sulting their shareholders;
! they further argued that this directive did not se-
cure a level playing field for shareholder rights in
the EU (there are for example ‘Golden Shares’
with special rights to vote in some European
countries) from what competitive disadvantages
could arise for some European countries;
Follow-up
! according to the European Commission is a new
version of the directive unlikely to ready before
2002;
Source: UNION NETWORK INTERNATIONAL (2001)
In addition to these regulative obstacles, different national tax legislation and other legal dif-
ferences represent market access barriers (QUESTIONING OF LEADING PAN-EUROPEAN BANKING
GROUPS, 2001 (Table 9)). For instance, credit collaterals are evaluated differently among
European countries, hindering the allocation of cross-border credits. Mergers and acquisitions
as the most important strategy of banks examined in this study can be seen as a way to deal
with that kind of barrier. In addition, different national accounting standards for companies,
bankruptcy principles and take-over arrangements obstruct market access by mergers and ac-
quisition. A common European take-over directive failed in the EU-parliament in 2001 (Table
12). Due to an uncommon take over-legislation as well as missing harmonization of company
and taxation legislation, a trend towards cooperations, strategic alliances as well as to joint
ventures – like BSCH with Société Générale (F), Royal Bank of Scotland (GB), San Paolo-
IMI (I) and Commerzbank (D) or BNP Paribas with Dresdner Bank (D) - can be recognized.
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Further harmonization and a stronger institutional coordination of these politically induced
market access barriers are useful to accelerate the integration of retail markets in Europe and
to achieve further consumer benefits.
6. Consumer benefits of an integrated European retail market
The integration of the European retail markets is associated with a number of benefits for con-
sumers. From a macroeconomic point of view, the integration first leads to an accelerated
development of financial markets (BUCH, 2000 and LEMMEN, 1998). Through different chan-
nels of transmission, the development of financial markets has positive effects on growth in a
second step. Important channels in this context are an improved allocation of savings capital
as well as the reduction of losses of saving capital. In addition, higher national income and
increasing growth also lead to a decreasing rate of unemployment (NEIMKE, EPPENDORFER
and BECKMANN, 2002).
Table 13: Price changes for corporate and retail customer deposits since the full imple-
mentation of the Single Market Program (1992-1997)
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Corporate customer deposits (large
firms)
-27 -18 -42 -31 -28 -40 -11 -22 -29 -26 -21 -25
Corporate customer deposits (small
firms)
-27 -13 -35 -29 -30 -37 -8 -30 -30 -29 -19 -24
Retail customer deposits -27 -31 -35 -30 -30 -37 -4 -32 -25 -28 -11 -23
Price defined as margin between rate paid to customer and money market rate (Changes in margin due to busi-
ness cycle effects excluded): -50 is ‘large decrease’, -25 is ‘small decrease’, 0 is ‘no change’, 25 is ‘small in-
crease’, and 50 is ‘large increase’, Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1997)
From the consumers point of view, increasing integration can be expected to have positive
effects on prices, product variety and the quality of services. Stronger competition in the
banking sector and lower operating costs conditional on new information and communication
technologies goes along with stronger price pressure on financial services. Interests and fees
for services decrease, differences between the European countries are reduced. Table 13 pro-
vides an overview of price changes for deposits since the implementation of the Single Market
Program in 1992. Simultaneously, banks are forced to extend the quality of financial services.
Competition in conjunction with technological progress leads to increased financial innova-
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tions and therefore to higher product variety. New technologies also offer consumers more
time flexibility, as they do no longer have to rely on branch opening hours to conduct their
business (LEYSHON, 2000).
In spite of the limits that are put on the integration of retail markets in the long run, the poten-
tial of integration is not exhausted by far. Problems originate from different regulation and
taxation that represent barriers to market access for the banking sector and thus for cross-
border trade in financial services. Further deregulation and harmonization steps towards a
common European financial market are needed to benefit consumers substantially.
7. Conclusions
Over the past years, European financial markets have integrated considerably. However, sig-
nificant differences still persist with regard to different sectors of financial markets. Within
the banking sector, the money market as well as the market for wholesale-products already
form common European markets. However, there still exists an extensive segmentation of
national markets for retail-products. Responsible for this low degree of retail market integra-
tion are a line of natural and politically induced barriers to banks` market access. In this paper
market access strategies were examined based both on aggregate data for the banking sector
and case studies of individual banks (Banco Santander Central Hispano, Nordea Group, BNP
Paribas and HSBC). Four main strategies were considered in particular: direct cross-border
sale (telephone- or internet banking), the establishment of branches and subsidiaries, mergers
and acquisitions, as well as cooperations and strategic alliances. It can be observed, that in
the last years, especially mergers and acquisitions followed by cooperations and strategic alli-
ances strongly contributed to the integration of the European retail markets. Each of the ex-
amined strategies, however, still has to deal with considerable barriers to market access. In
particular, such barriers are: different national tax legislation, different national consumer
protection rules, different national accounting standards and bankruptcy principles, different
solvency control, different take-over directives and different national supervision. In order to
bypass existing barriers, European banks have to adjust their strategies. For a stronger inte-
gration of European retail-markets, further harmonization of legislation and supervision seems
to be necessary. A further integration push would especially lead to an increase of consumers
benefits through lower prices and higher product variety of financial services.
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Appendix: The major mergers and acquisitions involving European banks since the in-
troduction of the Euro
Involved Banks
Acquirer Target
Kind of Transaction Assets 31 Dec 1998(Bn €)
Deutsche Bank
Bankers Trust
604
114
Deutsche Bank (D) Bankers Trust (USA) Acquisition
Total 718
BNP
Paribas
325
249Banque Nationale de Paris
(BNP) (F) Paribas (F)
Merger into
BNP Paribas Total 574
HSBC
Crédit Commercial
495
63
HSBC Holding Plc (GB) Crédit Commercial deFrance (F)
Integration of CCF into
the HSBC Group
Total 558
ING Group
BHF-Bank
395
45
ING Group (NL) BHF-Bank (D) Acquisition
Total 440
Générale de Banque
ASLK/CGER
208
80Générale de Banque –
General Bank (B) ASLK/CGER (B)
Merger
(Today part of the Bel-
gian-Dutch Fortis Group) Total 288
Banca Intesa
BCI
153
113
Banca Intesa (I) Banca CommercialeItaliana (BCI) (I) Merger into IntesaBCI Total 266
BSCH
Totta & Açores SA
Crédito Predial Portugues SA
234
17
6Banco Santander Central
Hispano (E)
Banco Totta & Açores SA
and Crédito Predial Portu-
gues SA (P)
Acquisition
Total 257
Banco Santander
Banco Central Hispanoamericano
154
82Banco Santander (E) Banco CentralHispanoamericano (E)
Merger into Banco
Santander Central
Hispano (BSCH) Total 236
Crédit Communal
Crédit Local
105
99Crédit Communal de
Belgique (B)
Crédit Local de
France (F)
Merger
(Today part of the Dexia
Group) Total 204
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria
132
70
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (E) Argentaria (E)
Merger into Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria
(BBVA) Total 202
Merita Nordbanken
Unidanmark Group
96
70Merita Nordbanken Plc
(FI) Unidanmark Group (DK)
Merger
to form Nordea
Total 166
SEB
BfG
73
42
SEB (S) BfG (D) Acquisition
Total 115
Source: Following ECB (2000a), ECB (2000c), DEUTSCHE BANK (2001), BNP PARIBAS (2001), FORTIS (2001),
INTESA BCI (2001), BSCH (2001), SEB (2001).
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